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DOESFOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTION MATTER?
DISENTANGLING THE PORTFOLIO ANDEXPECTATIONSEFFECTS FOR THE MARX
ABSTRACT
The time is ripe for a re-examination of thequestion whether foreign
exchange intervention can affect the exchange rate. Weattempt to isolate
twodistinct effects: the portfolio effect, whereby an increase in the
supply of marks must reduce the dollar/mark rate (for given expected rates
of return) and the additional expectations effect, whereby intervention
that is publically known may alter investors expectations of the future
exchange rate, which will feed back to the current equilibrium price. We
estimate a system consisting of two equations, one describing investors'
portfolio behavior and the other their formation of expectations, where the
two endogenous variables are the current spot rate and investors'
expectation of the future spot rate. We use relatively new data sources:
actual daily data on intervention by the Bundesbank, newspaper stories on
known intervention, and survey data on investors' expectations. We find
evidence of both an expectations effect and a portfolio effect. The
statistical significance of the portfolio effect suggests that even
sterilized intervention may have had positive effects during the sample
period. (It tends to be significant only during the later of our two
sample periods, October 1984 to December 1987. That intervention appears
less significant statistically during the earlier period, November 1982 to
October 1984, could be attributed to the fact that little intervention was
undertaken until 1985.)For the magnitude of the effects to be large
requires that intervention be publically known. Our (still preliminary)
estimates suggest that a typical $100 million of "secret" intervention has
an effect of less than 0.1 per Cent on the exchange rate, but that the
effect of news reports of intervention can be as large as an additional 4
per cent.
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KennedySchoolof Government Department of Economics
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Until recently, there was an unusual degree of consensus among
economists, and among policy-makers and participants in the financial
markets as well, that intervention by central banks in the foreign exchange
market did not offer an effective or lasting instrument for affecting the
exchange rate, at least not independently of monetary policy. The 1982 G-7
economic summit at Versailles commissioned a study of intervention, known
as the Jurgenson report, which found that the effects were small and
transitory at most.2
We think that the time is ripe for new statistical testing of the
question. Many policy-makers and foreign exchange traders believe that the
intervention operations that have taken place since the Plaza Agreement of
September 1985 have had an effect. Moreover, the theoretical case against
the effectiveness of intervention is not as clear as a reading of the
economics literature might suggest.
The academic literature is predicated on the distinction between
intervention operations that are sterilized and those that are not
sterilized. Intervention operations that change the supplies of domestic
and foreign money are considered nonsterilized. Sterilized intervention
operations, in contrast, are accompanied by offsetting open-market
operations which return the relevant money supply to its original level.
In this paper we do not concentrate on this distinction. We study the
intervention operations that actually took place between 1982 and 1987,
2
Many of the econometric results, finding little or no effect, were
reported in Rogoff (1984) and Henderson and Sampson (1983).
1regardless of whether they were sterilized.But we do begin in section II
with a review of the issuesinvolved.3
In this paper we examine the two possible channels throughwhich
intervention (whether sterilized or not) can influence the foreign exchange
rate; the portfolio and the expectations channels.Intervention can, even
if sterilized, influence exchange rates through the portfoliochannel
provided foreign and domestic bonds are considered imperfectsubstitutes in
investor's portfolios. Intervention operations that, for example,increase
the current relative supply of mark to dollar assets that privateinvestors
are obliged to accept into their portfolios, willforce a decrease in the
relative price of markassets.4 Intervention can also influence exchange
rates, regardless of whether foreign and domesticbonds are imperfect
substitutes, through the expectations channel. The public informationthat
central banks are intervening in support of a currency (or are planning to
intervene in the future) may. under certain conditions, cause speculators
to expect an increase in the price of that currency in the future.
Speculators react to this information by buying the currency today.
bringing about the change In the exchange rate today.
While some previous empirical studies of foreign exchange
intervention operations have found evidence from daily data that central
banks have had a statistically significant effect on exchange rates
(Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1987,1989)), the studies were notable to
distinguish whether the effect was coming through the portfolio or the
For authoritative statements, see Henderson (1984) or Obstfeld (1988).
The exchange rate reaction to an increase in the relative supply of
outside foreign assets may be reduced by an increase in their expected rate
of return that induces a corresponding increase in demand.
2expectations channel. The goal of this study is to disentangle the
influence of the two potential channels during the most recent experience
with central bank intervention operations. The empirical work was made
possible by an agreement with the German Bundesbank allowing use of
confidential daily intervention data over the period l982-l987. While the
Fed did not grant us official access to their daily intervention data over
this period, we constructed a daily intervention series for the U.S.
(including both Federal Reserve and Treasury initiated operations) from
descriptions of foreign exchange desk operations published in the Federal
Reservesankof New York Quarterly Review (FNYQR) and other Federal Reserve
publications.
The present study brings three distinct sources of information (related
to past work by the authors] to bear on the effects of intervention.
First, we measure expectations of the future spot exchange rate by means of
survey data on the forecasts of market participants. These data were
introduced in another Context by Frankel and Froot (1987) and Dominguez
(1986).6 Second, we use daily newspaper reports of intervention and
related news to distinguish public awareness of intervention operations, a
prerequisite for the expectations channel to be operative, from actual
intervention operations, a prerequisite for the portfolio channel to be
operative. Third, in the relationship connecting asset supplies to the
risk premium, we impose the constraint that the coefficient is
With the understanding that it be used under certain restrictions.
6
Subsequent studies using such survey data include Frankel and Froot
(1988), Froot and Frankel (1989), Froot and Ito (1988) and Ito (1989).
3proportionate to the time-varyingvariance of the exchange rate, as it
should be if investors choose their portfolios to diversifyoptimally.
These additional sources of information allow us toestimate a two-
equation system: an expectations-formation equationand a portfolio-
diversification equation. Our novel conclusion, based on our findingsfor
the dollar/mark exchange rate, is that both the portfolioand expectations
channels were effective during the sample period.
II. The Standard Theory: Sterilized vs. NonsterilizedIntervention
There are three standard arguments as to why the effectsof
intervention should be very small: the small size ofintervention relative
to the total market, Ricardian equivalence,and high international asset
substitutability. The latter two, if valid, imply thatthe effects of
sterilized intervention should be small or zero. The first impliesthat
the effects of intervention should be relatively small evenif
nonsterilized.
While the scale of intervention operations in recent yearsis
unprecedented, it remains small relative to thestocks or flows in the
foreign exchange market. A census of the volumeof foreign exchange
trading recently released by the New York Fed reported atotal of $129
billion per day (eliminating double-counting) in the United Statesin April
1989. Adding in London and Tokyo, the total exceeds $430billion. Daily
positions taken by banks and other individualinstitutions are much
smaller than the gross positions. However, the total net stocksof
currencies that could in theory be brought into the market at anytime are
considerably larger. U.S. 112, for example, currentlyexceeds $3,000
billion. By comparison the average coovdinated intervention operation
in
4support of the dollar during the period January 1985 to December 1987
involved $256 million, while the average coordinated sale of dollars
involved $208 million (Dominguez (1989), p.3k).
Standard models of exchange rate determination at least allow non-
sterilized intervention to have an effect on the exchange rate in
proportion to the change in the relative supplies of domestic and foreign
money, just as any other form of monetary policy does. The idea that
sterilized intervention operations, on the other hand, have any effect at
all, is less accepted. Those that conclude that sterilized intervention
can have no effect, base their arguments on either "Ricardian equivalence"
or the high substitutability between foreign and domestic bonds. We
consider these two arguments in turn.
If government bonds imply the public liability of future taxation to
service them, and if investors look far into the future, optimize
intertemporally, and internalize the welfare of future generations, then
government bonds are not true "outside" assets; they have no more effect on
market equilibrium than the issue of an IOU by one private citizen to
another. If government bonds are not true outside assets, it follows that
swaps in their currency composition have no effect on the foreign exchange
7
market equilibrium.
There are many arguments against Ricardian equivalence, both
theoretical and empirical; it is the sort of proposition that one would
like to test rather than impose. In any case, in recent years the lines of
distinction between "money" and "bonds" have become increasingly blurred.
It is not clear that the creation of a Money Market Deposit Account --
Forexample, Frankel (1979) and Backus and Kehoe (1988).
5which is part of M2. but is the liability of a privately-owned financial
institution rather than of the government -- shouldhave a fully
proportionate effect on the exchange rate, while the issue of a Treasury
Bill has no effect.
Even if it is granted that government bonds are "outside" assets, the
second line of argument against the effectiveness of sterilized
intervention is that domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, so
that changes in their relative supply have noeffect.8 A less extreme
version of the argument is that substitutability is very high, even if not
literally infinite, so that intervention (in the relevant magnitudes) can
have very little effect quantitatively. One point that is often missed is
that, even if it is true that the effect of sterilized intervention on the
differential in rates of return is very close to zero, the effect on the
level of the exchange rate may be relatively large. As long as changes in
bond supplies matter, they should have a proportionate effect on the
exchange rate (which is the relative price of foreign bonds, in the
portfolio model, not just the relative price of money) in the absence of
changes in the risk premium, no matter how high the degree of
substitutability.
Even for those who hold either to Ricardian equivalence or to the
assumption that foreign and domestic bonds are perfect substitutes, there
remains a channel whereby sterilized intervention can have an effect on
8In terms of equation (1) below, it is argued that b is infinite, or,
in terms of equation (4), that tv is zero.
Frankel (1985, 213-215). Once effects on the expected future rate
of change in the exchange rate are taken into account, the exchange-rate
effect of a one percent change in the relative supply of foreign assets
could be either more or less than one percent.
6exchange rates.Intervention operations can effect exchange rates through
the signalling channel if they are used by central banks as a means of
conveying (or signalling) to the market inside information about future
monetary policy. If market participants believe central bank intervention
signals, then even though today's money supply has not changed,
expectations of future monetary policy will change. When the market
revises its expectations of future money supplies, it also revises its
expectations of the future spot exchange rate, which brings about a change
in the current rate. The signalling channel is thus one example of the
expectations channel mentioned in the preceding section)0
It is known that daily intervention by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York is fully and automatically sterilized: the foreign exchange trading
room immediately reports its dollar sales to the open market trading room,
which then buys that many fewer bonds, so that the daily money supply is
precisely what it would have been if no intervention had occurred. This
leaves open the possibility that a Federal Reserve Board decision to try to
influence the exchange rate will result in both intervention and a
different money supply, say on a monthly basis. To the extent that the
market learns about such decisions by observing intervention, that is a
case of the signalling hypothesis. Trying to test the signalling
hypothesis by observing what happens to the money supply ex post, in finite
samples, would be a dubious way of approaching the question. Intervention
is at best but one of many factors relevant for determining the future
money supply; in finite samples the relationship might not be detectable.
This is especially true of one particular argument why an increase in the
10
An influential statement is Mussa (1981). See also Kenen (1981).
7supply of government debt today implies an increasein the money supply in
the future. The Sargent-Wallace 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic,"which
says that an increase in debt maybe explosive if it is not eventually
monetized, might not take effect until far after the end of the sample
period.
The Bundesbank and other smaller central banks are less prone to
complete sterilization than are the U.S. authorities; during periodsof
undesired dollar weakness, the Bundesbank often buys dollars for marks, and
to some extent allows the increase in reserves to swell the German money
supply. In this study, we do not prejudge the sterilization question.To
summarize, the expectations channel may or may not require that
intervention be allowed to affect future money supplies. The portfolio
channel presumably would require that sterilized intervention be effective,
but we allow the data to tell us whether this channel is in fact operative.
III. The Standard Econometrics
The portfolio-balance theory says that investors diversify their
holdings among domestic and foreign assets --includingbonds, if we do not
rule them out a Driori on the grounds of Ricardian equivalence -- as
functions of expected rates of return. Measuring the expected rates of
return requires both data on interest rates, which is easy, and data on
investors' expectations of exchange rate changes, which is very hard. Some
early tests assumed away this problem by setting expected depreciation
equal to zero, and simply looking for a relationship between the level of
the exchange rate and the supplies of domestic and foreignassets.11 But,
11For example, Branson, Haltunnen and Masson (1977). A more recent
attempt, with better measures of asset supplies, is Golub (1989).
8even aside from the expectations problem, these studies were plagued by a
second econometric difficulty: simultaneity.'2
A regression specification that avoids this simultaneity problem takes
the dependent variable to be the differential in expected rates of return
between domestic and foreign assets, rather than the level of the exchange
rate, and uses ex cost changes in the exchange rate to measure investors'
expectations by invoking the methodology of rational expectations.'3 Begin
by considering the asset-demand function that determines the portfolio
share x that is allocated to mark assets, as a function of the risk premium
rp:
x—a+brp (1)
where rp —1DM-+ 5ei is the euroDK interest rate, i is the
eurodollar interest rate, and is the expected change in the dollar/mark
spot exchange rate. Now invert the equation to express the risk premium as
a function of the aggregate supplies of assets that must be held in market
equilibrium:
-1 -l rp—-ab tb x. (2)
The special case where domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes
is the special case where b is infinite, the coefficient in equation
(2) is zero, and changes in assets supplies have no effect on the risk
premium. According to the rational expectations methodology, the ex post
change in the exchange rate, s, can be substituted for the expected
12
Coefficients on asset supplies often appeared statistically
significant, but with the wrong signs. When the Bundesbank reacts to an
increase in the dollar/mark rate by buying dollar assets and selling mark
assets, an apparent perverse relationship between the exchange rate and the
supply of dollar assets results.
13
See Dooley and Isard (1983) and Frankel (1982a).
9change, 5e, because the only differenceis a forecast error e that is
independent of x (and all other variables that are contemporaneously
observable). So we can run a regression on the resulting equation.
DM -i +As —-ab'+b1x+e .(3)
t+k t+k t+k tt+k
The regression estimate of the coefficientb in equation (3) is
generally found to be insignificantly different from zero, afailure to
reject the null hypothesis of perfectsubstitutability.14 Onepossible
explanation for this result is that there is insufficient powerin the
test. One way of bringing additional information to bear is to assumethat
investors choose their portfolio allocation, x, to optimize a functionof
the mean and variance of end-of-period wealth, from which it follows that
'equation (1) holds with a constraint imposed: the coefficientis inversely
proportionate to v, the variance of the returndifferential)5 In the case
where goods prices are nonstochastic, v is simply the variance of the
exchange rate, and a, the minimum-variance portfolio, is closelyrelated to
the share of German goods in the consumption basket of the investor. The




14At least that is what studies find when assets supplies x are
computed to include not only foreign exchange intervention, but also
government budget deficits, and other forms of asset creation that usually
dwarf intervention in magnitude. tE.g., Dooley and Isard (1983), Frankel
(1982a), and Roothe, Clinton, Cote, and Longworth (l985). Studies that
focus more narrowly on daily changes in asset supplies through foreign
exchange intervention do sometimes find an effect on the differential in
rates of return: Loopesko (1984) and Doainguez (1989).
References include Kouri and da Macedo (1978), Dornbusch (1983),
Frankel (1982b), Adler and Dwaas (1983), and ranson and Henderson (1985).
10where we have defined r to be the constant of proportionality, which is the
coefficient of relative risk-aversion.16
The rational expectations methodology assumes that the regression error
and forecast error are identical, so that the equation can be estimated
subject to the constraint that the coefficient is proportionate to the
variance of the error term. Despite the presumed increase in power, the
empirical literature generally fails to reject the null hypothesis of
perfect substitutability, which is now interpreted as risk-neutrality
(r—O))7 This finding is the same when the variance v is allowed to vary
over time, as in the popular ARCHmodels.18
Notwithstanding the elegance of the rational expectations methodology,
several econometric problems remain in the estimation of an equation like
(4), and they may be responsible for the results. First, the asset
supplies x may be measured with error, or the asset demand equation (1) may
hold only subject to an error term. In theory, either source of error
would be fairly easy to handle, provided that the error (like investors'
forecast error e) were independent of But it seems likely that
simultaneity bias has been a problem in practice, particularly since the
16This is the simplified form of the equation in Dornbusch (1983),
where a is interpreted as equal to the share of German goods in the
consumption basket of the investor in question. Krugman (1981) pointed Out
that a correct treatment of the convexity term that arises from Jensen's
Inequality makes the Constant term -(ra -a+ l/2)v, instead of -a(rv). In
what follows, the variable in the regression is v in either case, and it is




For example, Engel and Rodrigues (1989), Attanasio and Edey
(1987), and Giovannini and Jorion (1989).
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See Lewis (1988) and Engel and Rodrigues (1989).
11definition of the righthandside variable, the asset share, includes the
spot exchange rate s as part of its computation:
x —(SD1( /V),(5)
where Dfl is the quantity of deutschemark assets supplied to the public, and
V is total wealth expressed in dollars. Addressing this possible sourceof
simultaneity bias in the estimation of portfolio-balance equations is one
of the several goals of this study.2°
IV. gxpectations. and Our 'Two-EQuation System
The second set of econometric difficulties with estimating equation (4)
concern the measurement of the expectations variable in the risk premium.
Even if the rational expectations methodology Is valid, i.e, the forecast
error e is uncorrelated in-sample with all other contemporaneous variables,
there Is the undeniable problem that the magnitude of the error term is
extremely large. This could lead to low power: a failure to reject risk-
neutrality even though the coefficient of risk-aversion is in reality
greater than zero. Furthermore, there is reason to think that ex post
changes in the exchange rate are a particularly bad measure of what
Investors expected ex an. Independent estimates of market forecasts of
exchange rates, drawn from survey data, suggest that expected depreciation
varies closely with the forward discount, while ex post changes in the
exchange rate do not, and tend if anything to lie in precisely the opposite
direction.21 We choose to measure expectations by using the survey data
rather than cx post changes, on the grounds that (a) the evidence of bias
20In termsofthe identification problem, the excluded exogenous
variable that will help us estimate the equation is the one that captures
public news.
21
Froot and Frankel (1989).
12is damaging for the latter, and (b) the magnitude of the measurement error
is almost certainly larger for ex yost changes than for the survey data.







where the error term u is now meant to reflect any measurement error in the
data, rather than investors' forecasting errors. In light of the many
studies concluding that exchange rate changes have variances that are
autocorrelated over time, we choose to estimate the variance v as the daily
variance of exchange rate changes over the preceding week. To our
knowledge, despite the incipient spread of the use of the survey data, they
have not been used together with data on asset supplies and variances to
estimate a risk premium equation.
Equation (6), which captures the portfolio channel through which
intervention may have an effect, is only one of two equations in the system
we estimate. The other is an equation of expectations formation, where the
dependent variable, investors' forecast of the expected future spot rate,
is measured using the survey data.
Past work with the survey data shows clearly that the expected future
spot rate, in general, fluctuates roughly one-for-one in proportion to the
most recent realized spot rate. But other factors enter the equation as
well. Frankel and Froot (1987,1988) considered in turn three possible
alternative candidates for the other factor: (I) the lagged spot rate, in
which case the specification is extrapolative expectations, (2) the lagged
expectation, in which case the specification is adaptive expectations, and
(3) a long-run equilibrium measured by Purchasing Power Parity, in which
13case the specification is regressive expectations. In each case, the
variable in question entered with statistical significance.22
Although a number of different surveys at different horizons are
available, we use here the 1-week and 4-week ahead survey forecasts
conducted by Money Market Services, International, for the period October
24, 1984 to December 18, 1987. Unlike some other surveys, it is conducted
on a weekly basis (since July 1985; before that it was conducted every two
weeks). Longer horizons do not seem relevant for the majority of trading
in the foreign exchange market.23
In addition, we report results for the earlier period November 17,
1982, to October 10, 1984, when the survey was conducted every two weeks
and pertains to 3-month ahead forecasts. One might expect that
intervention would have a greater effect in the later period, since the
Reagan Administration's firm commitment to free-floating began to change
when Don Regan and ery1 Sprinkel were succeeded at the Treasury by James
Baker and Richard Darman in January 1985 and when the Plaza Agreement
24
followed in September.
22Its coefficient is only positive, with a slightly less-than-unit
coefficient on the contemporaneous spot rate, when the forecast horizon is
3 months or longer.
23
There is evidence that most foreign exchange trading takes place
among banks, with rapid turnover and correspondingly short investment
horizons. The recent New York Fed census of foreign exchange trading found
that in April 1989 only 4.9 per cent of banks' trading was with a
nonfinancial firm. In other words, banks trade with each other much more
than with ultimate customers. See Goodhart (1988) and Frankel and Froot
(1988) for more on this theme.
24
The Germans began to intervene seriously to try to push the dollar
down in February 1985 (Funabashl. (1988)).
14The specification we choose here is general in that it allows for both
extrapolative and adaptive expectations. At the 4-week horizon,
respondents have been observed to put negative weight on the lagged spot
rate and more-than-unit weight on the contemporaneous spot rate, so that
they are extrapolating the recent trend into the future to get their
25
forecast. Previous work has also found evidence that respondents form
their predictions adaptively, putting positive weight on the lagged survey
prediction (Frankel and Froot (1987)). Finally, we also include a constant
term in the expectations equation, to represent the long-term equilibrium
toward which investors may expect the spot rate to regress (or away from
which investors may expect the spot rate to explode, as the case may be).
The fourth variable in our expectations equation is a NEWS variable
meant to capture information appearing in the newspaper about the central
bank's exchange rate policy. NEWS is set equal to +1 if there were reports
of central bank action in support of the dollar, -1 if there were reports
of action against the dollar, and 0 if there were no such reports. Thus we
expect NEWS to have a negative effect on expectations of the future
dollar/mark rate.The NEWS variable included not only reports of actual
intervention but also, for example, official statements by Treasury and
Central Bank officials that they would like the exchange rate to go in a
25
Frankel and Froot (1988). Models based on technical analysis
(which often essentially extrapolate past trends) are more widely-used by
professional forecasting services, especially at short horizons, than
models based on macroeconomic fundamentals (which could be viewed as
regressive expectations). Euromoney magazine runs a yearly review of
foreign exchange forecasting services; of 27 firms covered in 1988, 12
used only technical models, only I relied exclusively on fundamentals
models, and 12 used a combination of the two techniques.
15particular direction, or that a G-7 meeting may be scheduled in response to
exchange rate worries.
We also include a variable for "reported intervention" equal to a dummy
variable for newspaper reports of intervention (a subset of the reports
captured by the NEWS variable) multiplied by the amount of true
intervention. This variable allows us to quantify the difference between
publically known intervention of a given size and discrete (so-called
"stealth," or secret) intervention.
The second equation in our system is thus:
5t+k't —a0+ + cc2(at1÷k + X3NEWSt +cz4REPI
+ (7)
where '+k is log of the ?*IS survey prediction of the spot rate in period
t+k, a is the log of the contemporaneous spot rate, s_ is the log of the
spot rate on the day of the last MNS survey, NEWSt is a (1,0,-i) dummy
variable which captures reports of exchange rate policy news, and PEPIt is
reported Bundesbank and Fed intervention measured in dollars. We choose to
date the "contemporaneous" spot rate at 7:00 a.m. EST, so that we can be
sure that it is known to market participants when they formulate the
forecasts that they report to MMS International the next morning.
Nevertheless simultaneity may be a problem: if demand for dollars relative
to marks at 7:00 a.m. EST is in part determined by expectations reflected
in the next mornings survey, then the contemporaneous spot rate Sis
endogenous. But our set-up is designed to deal with precisely this
problem: we have two endogenous variables, a and s, and twoequationsto
be estimated simultaneously. In terms of the identification problem, the
exogenous variables that are excluded from equation (7) and that can serve
16as instrumental variables for s are the variance v and the total quantity
of marks sold in foreign exchange intervention (measured in marks) 1DM.
V. The Estimation Results
The regression results for the expectation equation (7) and the
portfolio equation (6) are presented in six pairs of tables. All tables
with the "A" suffix present regression results over the period November
1982 through October 1984 using 3-month-ahead survey expectations of the
dollar/mark exchange rate. Tables with the "B" suffix present results over
the period October 1984 through December 1987 using 1-month-ahead survey
expectations. [Results using 1-week-ahead survey expectations also over
the latter period are presented in the Appendix.) Further, in the first
three pairs of tables we present single-equation estimates to provide a
basis for comparison. The instrumental variable estimates for the two
equations are presented in the second three pairs of tables. Finally, in
all of the tables we present results for three measures of the intervention
variable. "1-day" intervention is Fed and Bundesbank purchases of dollars
on the day before the survey. "14-day' or "7-day"interventionis
cumulated between survey dates, so that it measures total Fed and
Bundesbank dollar purchases since the last survey. "Total" intervention is
cuniulated from the beginning of the sample period and therefore measures
the relative stock supplies of outside assets denominated in dollar and
mark currencies.
We begin with the expectations equation (7), reported in Tables 1A,B
and 4A,B. When equation (7) is estimated by OLS allowing for a serial
correlation correction (Tables IA,B), the coefficient on the difference
between the lagged and contemporaneous spot rate is always negative, as in
17the destabilizing extrapolativemodel.26 The estimated extrapolative
coefficient tends to be larger in magnitudewhen the regression is
estimated using instrumental variables to correctfor endogeneity of the
spot rate (Tables 4A,B).The coefficient on the adaptive term (the
difference between the lagged survey predictionand contemporaneous spot
rate) is, in contrast, always positive indicatingthat expectations are
stabilizing. Again, the estimated adaptivecoefficient tends to be larger
in magnitude in the instrumented regressions.The absolute values of the
estimated coefficients on the extrapolative and adaptiveterms in the
regressions are similar in magnitude makingit difficult to access whether
expectations are, on net, destabilizing or stabilizing;but the former seem
to dominate during the key 1985-87 period.
The more interesting finding in the context of the signalling
hypothesis is that the coefficient on the NEWSvariable usually appears
statistically significant for the one- and three-monthhorizon
expectations, and of the correct sign: newspaper reportsof prospective
intervention In support of the dollar and related storiestend to lower
expectations of the future dollar/mark exchange rate.The average news
effect on the 1-month ahead expectations of the dollar mark exchangerate
is on the order of .005 to .007 per cent. This is trueboth for the 01.5
estimates (Table 16) and for the instrumental variables estimates(Table
46). The reported intervention variable is significantin two of the three
instrumented regressions for the latter sample period (table 46).
We now turn to the risk-premium, the portfolio equation (6).We
present OLS regression results for (6) in Tables 2A,Band 3A,B and
26These are similar to estimates in Frankel and Froot (1988).
18instrumental variable results in Tables SA,B and 6A,S. The intervention
variable (defined as x in the text) is expressed in each of two alternative
possible ways: in terms of millions of dollars' in Tables 2A,S and SA,B,
and as a percent of total wealth U in Tables 3A,S and 6A.B. (Wealth, U, is
measured as the total supply of U.S. and German federal goverruaent debt
that has been issued and so must be held in investors' portfolios.)The
first alternative is the approach of Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez
(1987,1989). In the case when the intervention variable is simply
expressed in number of dollars bought on the foreign exchange market (times
the variance), its coefficient should be interpreted as nW. rather than
simply as r. The second alternative -- whichis the approach of Dooley and
Isard (1982,1983), Frankel (l982a,1982b), and Soothe, Clinton, Cote and
Longworth (1985) -- ismore in accordance with the asset-market theory of
exchange rate determination; but it has in the past turned out less likely
to give "goode results: intervention is in practice dwarfed by government
deficits and other sources of changes in asset supplies. Finally, in the
regressions where intervention is expressed as percent of wealth, we
further disaggregate the data by including Bundesbank and Fed intervention
separately. The three separate sets of regressions, therefore, include
intervention measured as the sumofBundesbank and Fed intervention
intervention by the Sundesbank IBS• and intervention by the Fed IFED.27
27While the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates on the
intervention variable (however defined) of course change dramatically
depending on whether intervention is expressed in millions of dollars or as
a percent of wealth, the statistical significance of the coefficientis
consistent across the two definitions. We therefore, in the interest of
space, do not include regression results for Fed and Sundesbank
intervention, separately, expressed in millions of dollars.
19Begin with the OLS estimates [tables 2 and 31.Whenintervention is
measured either between surveys or on the day before the survey in the
latter sample period, the effect of the variance of spot changes on the
risk premium is generally statistically significant at the 95 per cent
level. This finding is itself ofinterest.28 But our primary focus here
is on the effect of intervention, and it is not statistically significant
for the October 1982 -October1984 sample period. Again, this is not
surprising, as the sample size is small and this was the period when there
was no official U.S. support forintervention.29 But even for the later
sample period, the OLS regressions show significance only for the effects
of 1-day intervention on the 1.month-term risk premium.
As discussed earlier, the single equation estimates of the portfolio
regression are vulnerable to concerns of simultaneity bias due to the
endogeneity of the spot exchange rate, used to translate the marks sold in
intervention into dollar terms so as to be able to divide by wealth
expressed in dollars. That is why we report simultaneous-equation
estimates of equation (6) in tables SA,B and 6A,B, using as instruments:
last week's spot rate, the NEWS variable, and the reported component of
Bundesbank and Fed intervention. During the later period, October 1984 to
December 1987, the coefficient on intervention estimated by instrumental
variables is generally statistically significant, regardless of whether it
28Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) test for a relationship between the
variance and the risk premium, with the latter defined using the
conventional rational expectations methodology.
29Indeed, what little U.S. intervention there was shows up with a
high standard error and the wrong sign when Bundesbank and Fed intervention
are included separately in the regressions.
20is expressed in millions of dollars (Table 56) or as a percent of wealth
(Table 6B).°
Tables 7 and 8 present OLS and instrumental variable estimates,
respectively, over the latter sample period for an unconstrained version of
the portfolio equation (equation (3)) that enters the variance and asset
supplies linearly, rather than constraining them to enter in multiplicative
form.31 The OLS results in Table 7 are similar in terms of statistical
significance to the analogous constrained version results presented in
Table 26. Likewise, the instrumental variable results in Table 8 are
similar to those presented in Table SB. These results suggest that even
using the simple linear specification, we can generally reject perfect
asset substitutability in the latter sample period.
The finding that the instrumented coefficients on the intervention
variable are generally statistically significant in equations 3 and 6 (for
the latter sample period) implies that intervention has an effect, even if
sterilized. The reason is that if mark and dollar assets' were perfect
substitutes, then the coefficient should be zero: changes in asset supplies
would have no effect on the risk premium.
30Recall that, in theory, the coefficient of the product of the
intervention variable and the variance is the coefficient of relative risk-
aversion. Uben intervention is defined as percent of wealth the estimates
of the coefficient of risk aversion implicit in the Tables are extremely
large. This result is an artifact, not of the particular estimation
technique, but of the optimal-diversification theory, as has been noted
before: e.g., Krugman (1981). It follows from equation (4) that for
intervention to have a non-negligible effect on the risk premium, either
the coefficient of risk-aversion r must be much higher than 2, or the
proper denominator for x must be much smaller than the total stock supply
of marks and dollars.
31
Analogous unconstrained regression results using the one-week-ahead
expectations survey data are presented in Appendix Tables A7 and AS.
21VI. A Summary of the Ouantitative Effects
For purposes of illustration, we now cry out some sample parameter
estimates in calculations of the effect of intervention on the exchange
rate. We assume in these experiments that interest rates in Germany and
the United States are held Constant (which, for some readers, might mean
that we are talking about sterilized intervention). If interest rates
were allowed to vary, then the effects in a general portfolio-balance model
might be either smaller or larger than those reported here, depending on
whether the intervention were sterilized or not sterilized.
First, consider the effect of intervention on the exchange rate if it
is not known publically. tRecall that this experiment precludes any
effects that run via expectations of future asset supplies.J We begin with
the baseline case where expectations are assumed to be neither
extrapolative nor adaptive. If one wants to take the extrapolative and
adaptive parameters to be non-zero, the baseline case is still relevant as
a description of the long-run equilibrium (where 35-i and are
zero). Under these assumptions, the intervention has no effect at all on
the risk premium.
It follows from equation (6) that the effect of the intervention on
the spot exchange rate is simply in proportion to the change in the supply
of mark assets. What is the proportion represented by, say, $100 million
dollars of intervention? If we are thinking of the case where only non-
sterilized intervention matters, then the denominator is relatively clear:
total reserve nonay supplied to the banking system by the Bundesbank,
which, as of the end of 1987. was $126.3billion [—DM199.7 billion /
1.58151.Thus the effect is only .079 par cent. If we are thinking of
22sterilized intervention, then the effect of $100million will be even
smaller, because the denominator is the total supply of mark-denominated
bonds, rather than just money. (But it is worth recalling again that this
effect, even if small, is nonetheless not zero, according to our rejection
of perfect substitutability between mark and dollar bonds.)
To get large effects on the exchange rate, we need the public to hear
the news of the intervention. Our second experiment considers the effect
of such information in isolation, as reflected in the coefficient on our
NEWS variable, even if such intervention is in fact not taking place.[If
intervention actually takes place ispublically reported, then its
total effect would be the sum of the (small) effect reported in the
preceding paragraph, plus the (much larger) effect reported in this
paragraph, plus the effect implied by the coefficient on the KEPI variable
when significant.) Under our baseline case (no change in interest rates
and no extrapolative or adaptive expectationsi, the risk premium simply
changes by the coefficient of NEWS in the expectation equation: .007, to
take an INST estimate for one-month-ahead expectations in Table 4B. Such a
change in the risk premium will have a large effect on the demand for mark
versus dollar assets.
The effct of the change on the exchange rate is simply proportional
to the effect on x/lx, the ratio of the portfolio demand for marks to
the portfolio demand for dollars. Our preferred estimate of the
coefficient on from equation (6), for Federal Reserve I-day
intervention, is 168,903 (this is from the third row of Table 6B: for the
period October 1984 to December 1987, using the one-month risk premium and
the simultaneous-equation estimate). The average value of v during this
23period was .0000115. It follows that the average effecto the news was to
lower the portfolio demand for marks x by .0036 (—.007/(l68,903 x
.0000115)1, and to raise lx by the same amount. The average value of
during the period (measured as total debt issued by the German government,
divided by the total of German and U.S. debt) was .0994, and so the average
value of was .9006. Thus the average effect of a news report was to
change x/l-z, the ratio of the portfolio demand for marks to the
portfolio demand for dollars, from .110 (—.0991.901) to .106 (—.096/.904J.
This represents a 4 per cent decline in and therefore in the
exchange rate.
At the ofthe sample period, the value of was .121 (because the
value of the mark was much higher ($.6l3 as compared to $.437)), and so 1-
was .879. Thus the effect of a news report at that time would have been
to change x/lz, the ratio of the portfolio demand for marks to the
portfolio demand for dollars, from .138 (—.1211.879) to .133 (—.1171.883),
an effect of 3 per cent on the exchange rate.
These effects seem rather high (and they would be considerably higher if
the estimate was taken from the coefficient on Bundesbank intervention,
rather than that on Federal Reserve intervention). One's intuition that
the effect should in reality be smaller can easily be fit into any of
several categories. First, it is possible, even if we are talking about
intervention that is sterilized in the sense that there is no change in the
money supply, that the interest rates will absorb some of the impact of the
decreased demand for mark assets (the Cerman interest rate rising and the
U.S. Interest rate falling), so that the depreciation of the mark will be
smaller. Onewouldneed to specify a complete portfolio balance model to
24answer how big the changes in the interest rates would be. But the effect
on the nominal interest differential would only have to be 35 basis points
to wipe out half of the reported effect on the spot rate.
Second, if one wishes to deviate from the baseline case to consider the
possibility of extrapolative expectations, then the effects reported above
obtain only in the long-run equilibrium in which s-a1 is zero. The
short-run impact effect could be smaller.32 For some readers an
intuitively appealing implication of extrapolative expectations is that,
after the first-week impact of the news, market forecasters react further
to the observed change in the exchange rate by jumping on the bandwagon, so
that the effect grows in subsequent weeks.33 Others may prefer to believe
that expectations are regressive rather than extrapolative; or that
newspaper reports or other random disturbances to the level of the spot
rate, to the extent that they are not confirmed subsequently by actual
observed changes in macroeconomic fundamentals, will gradually lose their
effect on the spot rate as time passes, and that this "unwinding factor" is
not adequately captured in our equations. This last possibility would
32On the other hand, if market participants are believed to have
adaptive or regressive expectations, then the impact in short-run
equilibrium will be higher than in long-run equilibrium, the familiar
overshooting hypothesis. Estimates in Frankel and Froot (1988) showthat
expectations are extrapolative at the short-term horizons, but turn
regressive at 6-month and 1-year horizons.[We did not try these horizons
in our estimates here, partly because they are only available (from the
Financial Report) at six-week. intervals.j
C.Fred Bergsten. for example, has urged that Central Banks
intervene by "leaning into the wind," which could be interpreted as getting
a bandwagon or snow-balling effect going.
25constitute a third factor that could reduce the effect on the spot rate in
long-run equilibrium below that reportedabove.34
Our own inclination is to believe that expectations only tend to be
extrapolative in occasional periods: "speculative bubble" environments,
when the foreign exchange market "loses its moorings" and forecasters
forget about fundamentals. Of course, these are precisely the periods in
which Central Bankers might be most interested in using the tool of
35
intervention.
The last circumstance in which the effect on the spot rate would be
less than that estimated here is if the event occurs during a period when
the variance is higher than it is on average. Again, these might be the
precisely periods in which Central Bankers would be most interested in
using intervention as a short-term tool, to smooth "disorderlymarkets."36
A related point concerns the famous "Lucas critique." If the
Central Bank adopted a policy of routinely making public announcements of
its intervention -- whichis not its practice now -- eachannouncement
would not continue to have the same impact as in our estimates (unless,
perhaps, it was sufficiently backed up by a correspondingly greater degree
of actual changes in asset supplies). Our estimates only purport to say
what the effect was during the regime actually in effect during the sample
period.
References include Krugman (1985), Frankel (1985), Harris (1985),
Frankel and Froot (1988), and Williamson and Miller (1987).
36
On the other hand, the financial press often talks of central
bankers' intervention operations as seeking to have an effect on market
behavior precisely by creatinE extra volatility, and thereby "punishing"
nasty speculators. Our estimates imply that a change in volatility can
indeed have a significant impact on investors' asset demands. But, aside
from the difficulty of driving out nasty destabilizing speculators without
also driving out good stabilizing speculators, and aside from the general
undesirability of creating needless volatility, there is another problem
with this theory. If the supply of dollar assets in the market exceeds the
share in the minimum-variance portfolio, then an increase in the variance
will work to deDrecjae the dollar (for a given risk premium), which may
not be the direction desired by the authorities.
26Our results cannot be viewed as definitive. We plan to extend the
framework in several directions, such as including other currencies.
Nevertheless, to sum up, the findings for the dollar/mark rate during our
mid-l980s sample period are generally favorable for the effectiveness of
intervention. There appear to be statistically significant effects
throughthe expectations channel throughthe portfolio channel.The
quantitative effects can vary, depending both on the particular estimates
chosen for the key parameters and on the precise experiment that one wishes
to consider. But we hope that the statistical significance of the effects
that we find will contribute to a re-evaluation of the conventional wisdom
as to the ineffectiveness of intervention.
27DATA SOURCES MD VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
st: log of the 51DM spot exchange rate (DRI)
k:
log of Money Market Services (MMS) median k-period-ahead
t• expectation for the $/DM rate.
NEWS: +1 for reports ofcentral bank purchases, etc. ,insupport of
dollar
-l for reports of central bank purchases, etc., in support of
mark
0 for no relevant newspaper reports
(Newspapers: Wall Street Journal, London Financial Times)
REPI: actual Bundesbank and Fed intervention, inmillions of $s, when
reports of intervention appeared in the newspaper
daily variance of $/DM exchange rate changes over the preceding
week
iDk: euroDM k-period-ahead interest rate (DRI)
euro$ k-period-ahead interest rate (DRI)
k: log of the 1IMSk-period-ahead51DM exchange rate minus the log of
the time t 51DM exchange rate.
It:
sumofBundesbank and Fed intervention, in millions of $
IDM:
sumofBundesbank and Fed intervention, in millions of DM
Bundesbank intervention, in millions of $
IFED:
Fed intervention, in millions of $
* Allintervention variables are known at time t (purchases and sales
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.049 -.005*.214.06 .304** .13 2.05
(.086) (.003) (.241-06) (.116)
(REPI) is an end-of-day before the survey measure.
is an accumulated measure between survey forecasts.
is an accumulated measure from the beginning of the
level; **significant at the95% level.
29Table 2A
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: OLS




BI-WEEKLYTHREE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS—S1, k—90)





1DAYa .006 116.90 -.0139 754** .44 2.24
(.005) (132.49) (3.0396) (.122)
l4DAYb .005 93.26 -.1664 •774** .452.29
(.006) (131.19) (.2277) (.118)
TOTALC .006 88.59 -.0087 .769** .442.26
(.005) (161.81) (.0300) (.122)
Table 28
SAMPLE: October 1984 -December1987
WEEKLY ONE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS—153, k—i)
1-DAY .002 204.99** .6229* .429** .242.16
(.002) (74.91) (.3317) (.080)
7-DAY .002 159.l0** .0645 .436** .22 2.17
(.002) (73.19) (.1205) (.081)
TOTAL .002 -346.83 -.0278 .436** .232.16
(.002) (465.62) (.0251) (.080)
a) Intervention variable (I) is an end-of-day before the survey measure.
b) Intervention variable is an accumulated measure between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variable is an accumulated measure from the beginning of the
sample period.




1DM -t+k+ AS+k —o+lt + fl2V*X + Uk
al-WEEKLY THREE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREI1IUM EQUATION
(OBS— Si, k—90)
(Intervention expressed as percent of wealth.)
INTERV-
ENTION 2(x—I)2(x—IBB) fl2(x—IFED) RHO
R2D.W.
1DAya .006118.17 1459.91 •755** .45 2.25
(.005) (132.08) (38646.69) (.122)
.006113.62 -4666.69 .756** .45 2.25
(.005) (134.04) (48288.90) (.122)
.006 116.70 56559.85 .759** .45 2.25
(.005) (128.21) (137063.70) (.122)
l4.DAYb .006 92.46 -2400.69 .774** .45 2.30
(.006) (130.61) (3011.58) (.118)
.006 91.57 -2691.11 .775** .45 2.30
(.006) (130.87) (3384.62) (.117)
.006 106.79 -13169.65 .760** .45 2.29
(.005) (128.91) (21040.87) (.122)
TOTALC .006 83.74 -141.02 .771** .45 2.27
(.006) (163.52) (425.31) (.121)
a) Intervention variables (I. IBB, IFED) are end-of-day beforethe survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between surveyforecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginningof the
sample period.




t+k -t+k+ — p0+p1v
+fl2v*x
+Ut+k
WEEKLYONE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS— 133, k—30)
(Intervention expressed as percent of wealth.)
INTERV- 2
ENTION l fi2(x—I) fl2(x—IBB) p2(x—IFED)
RHO RD.W.
1DAya .002 202.81**9351.99* .431** .24 2.16
(.002) (74.68) (5067.35) (.080)
.002201.34** 9154.76* .433** .24 2.16
(.002) (75.07) (5410.92) (.080)
.002l75.42** 134188.70** 433** .26 2.15
(.002) (70.88) (51228.66) (.080)
7DAYb .002 16l.79**1282.98 435** .22 2.17
(.002) (72.67)(2367.96) (.081)
.002138.59* 3891.16 .420** .23 2.16
(.002) (77.64) (4184.79) (.083)
.002166.63** 376.55 .448** .22 2.17
(.002) (75.25) (4664.66) (.080)
TOTALC .002262.80 96.75 445** .22 2.16
(.002) (385.00) (373.51) (.079)
a) Intervention variables (I, lEE, IFED) are end-of-day before the survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between surveyforecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginningof the
sample period.
*significantat the 90% level; **significantat the 95% level.
32Table 4A
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
SAMPLE: November 1982 -October1984
SkSt —o÷ .x(s s) + a2 + Cx3NEWS + u4REPI + Et
31-WEEKLY THREE-MONTH-AHEAD SURVEY EXPECTATION EQUATION




1-DAy5-.006 l.050** 1.158** -.007** .516-04 -.416 1.73
(.011) (.373) (.527) (.003)(.131-03) (1.256)
14DAYb -.0081.O93** l.218** -.007** .494-07 -.434 1.73
(.013) (0.489) (0.536) (.003)(.830-05) (1.046)
TOTALC .008 -.352 .582 -.006** .117-05 -.420 1.65
(.012) (.499) (.489) (.003) (.753-06) (.998)
Table 43
SAMPLE: October 1984 -December1987
WEEKLY ONE-MONTH-AHEAD SURVEY EXPECTATION EQUATION
(OBS— 133. k—30, j—7)
1-DAY .003 -1.175** .942** -.005 .579-05 -.270 2.02
(.002) (.368) (.223) (.003)(.202-04) (2.536)
7-DAY .003 l.1l3** .732** ...007**.104.04** -.269 2.02
(.002) (.379) (.205) (.003)(.386-05) (5.291)
TOTAL .003 .1.628** .981** -.005 .48406* -.292 1.99
(.002) (.429) (.238) (.003) (.281-06) (15.773)
a) Intervention variables (REPI, 1DM) are end-of-day before the survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginning of the
sample period.

















SAMPLE: October 1984 -December1987








a) Intervention (I, REPI) are end-of-day
b) Intervention are accumulated measures
c) Intervention are accumulated measures
sample period.
*significantat the 90% level; **significantat the 95% level.
34
Table 5A
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES




































before the survey measures.
between survey forecasts.






+Sk o+ + fl2v*I+Ut+k
BI-WEERLY THREE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS— 51, k—90)
INSTRUMENTS: s ,NEWS,REFIt
(Intervention expressed as percent of wealth.)
INTERV -
ENTION 2(x—IBB)2(x—IFED) RHOD.J.
1DAya .007-36.37 -51026.15 .736** 2.32
(.005) (177.93) (54546.04) (.248)
.007 -62.38 -78031.25 •739** 2.35
(.005) (184.89) (73981.73) (.249)
.007 -557 -79153.85 •734** 2.27
(.005) (170.96) (172108.60) (.272)
l4DAYb .007 -76.79 -4246.85 .770** 2.38
(.006) (176.54) (4126.61) (.214)
.007 -57.67 -3593.72 .769** 2.35
(006) (177.81) (4854.12) (.234)
.007 -60.04 -33076.56 •744** 2.37
(.005)(17287) (2717084) (.252)
TOTALC .012** 533.51*2577.16** .3081.83
(.003) (288.02) (943.12) (.633)
a) Intervention variables (I, IBS, IFED, REPI) are end-of-day before the
survey measures.
-
b)Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginning of the
sample period.
*significantat the 90% level; **significantat the 95% level.
35Table 6B
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES




WEEKLY ONE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS— 133, k—30)
INSTRUMENTS: NEWSt. REPIt




l..DAYa .002 181.17** 11231.26** .423** 2.16
(.002) (82.01) (5576.69) (.181)
.002 181.32** 11435.18* .424** 2.16
(.002) (82.49) (5961.83) (.179)
.002 150.09* 168903.80*.424** 2.15
(.002) (78.31) (88580.14) (.190)
7DAYb .002 110.4810229.34** .315 2.10
(.002)(82.54) (4714.61) (.268)
.003 56.69 12518.91* .346 2.12
(.002) (92.89) (7334.16) (.251)
.001 214.76** 20012.59* .354 2.11
(.002) (93.63) (10607.68) (.223)
TOTALC .0031847.76*1684.77* .378 2.14
(.002) (994.83) (978.64) (.264)
a) Intervention variables (I, IBB, IFED, REPI) are end-of.day before the
survey measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginning of the
sample period.
*significantat the 90% level; **significantat the 95% level.
36Table 7
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: OLS
SAMPLE: October 1984 -December1987
OH $
t+k
-t+k+ —a0 +a1v++ Uk
WEEKLYUNCONSTRAINED ONE-MONTH-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OS— 133, k—30)
(Intervention expressed in millions of $.)
INTERV-
ENTION l a2(x—I) fl2(x—IBB) 2(x—IFED)
RHO R2OW.
iDAYa .001 200.42**.28OO4** .4l2** .26 2.15
(.002) (72.26) (.103-04) (.081)
.002 199.88** .29204** .426** .25 2.16
(.002) (72.79) (.123-04) (.080)
.002 167.49** .365-04 433** .26 2.16
(.002) (72.01) (.227-04) (.079)
lDAYb .002153.53** .422-05 .403** .23 2.14
(.002) (72.87)(.277-05) (.083)
.002 151.77** .378-05 .421** .23 2.16
(.002) (74.33) (.478-05) (.083)
.002 l70.24** .674-05 .428** .24 2.15
(.002) (72.18) (.442-05) (.080)
TOTALC -.009165.78** -.572-06 .438** .23 2.16
(.011) (72.25) (.579-06) (.079)
a) Intervention variables (I, IBJ, IFED) are end-of-day before the survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginningof the
sample period.
*significantat the 90% level; **significantat the 95% level.
37Table 8






WEEKLYUNCONSTRAINED ONE-MONTH-AhEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS—133, k—30)
INSTRUMENTS: NEWSt. REPI
(Intervention expressed in millions of $.)
INTERV-
ENTION 2(x—I) 2(x—IBB) 2(x—IFED)
RHO D.W.
lDAya .002 173.25** .283.04** .409** 2.15
(.002)(78.86) (.113-04) (.194)
.002 169.04** .271O4** .427** 2.16
(.002) (79.98) (.136-04) (.181)
.002 138.83* .405-04 .429** 2.16
(.002) (79.26) (.249-04) (.179)
7.DAYb .002 85.22 .230O4** .218 2.03
-
(.002)(89.01) (.666-05) (.425)
.003 115.96 .579-05 .404* 2.15
(.002) (81.59) (.529-05) (.211)
.002 139.22* .747-05 .423** 2.15
(.002) (79.11) (.486-05) (.187)
TOTALC .014 138.42* .638-06 .481** 2.20
(.029) (81.19) (.155-05) (.179)
a) Intervention variables (I, IBB, IFED, REPI) are end-of-day before the
survey measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginning of the
sample period.
*significantat the 90% level; **significantat the 95% level.
38a) Intervention variables (REPI, 1DM) are end-of-day before the survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginningof the
sample period.


















lDAYa .004** -.165 .046 -.002 -.155-04 .154
(.001) (.101) (.113) (.002) (.122-04) (.108)
.051.98
i-DAY' .004** -.132 .038 -.004* .6l90S** .109
(.001) (.101) (.112) (.002)(.298-05) (.112)
.071.98
TOTALC .004** -.147 .036 -.003 .381-06 .137
(.001) (.102) (.115) (.002) (.603-06) (.108)
.041.98
Table A2




1-DAY .0011.611* .L505* -.005 -.121-04 -.207
(.002) (.908)(.796) (.004) (.215-04) (2.931)
2.07
7-DAY .002 1.091.1.ll8* -.005*.611-05 -.218
(.002) (.691)(.630) (.003) (.431-05) (1.162)
2.07
TOTAL .0021.292* l.429** -.004 .106-05 -.2112.06Table A3
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: OLS





WEEKLYONE-WEEK-AHEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OBS—153, k—7)
(Intervention in millions of $)
Table A4
ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
INSTRUMENTS: NEWSt. REPIt
RHO D.W.
144.63** .3717 .128 2.00
(59.94) (.4452) (.525)
96.78 .3149* .088 1.99
(62.28) (.1948) (.766)
-375.63 -.0846 .174 2.03
(390.81) (.0652) (.394)
(I, REPI) are end-of-day before the survey measures.
are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
















































1DM - +t+k —O+ lt + + Ut+k
WEEKLY ONE-WEEK-ABEAD RISK PREMIUM EQUATION
(OSS— 153, k—7)
(Intervention expressed as percent of wealth.)
INTERV -
ENTIONo 2(x—I)2(x—IBB) 2(x—IFED) RHO
R2D.W.
1DAYa .0007135.95** 3795.20 .135.07 2.00
(.001) (58.93) (6463.70) (.083)
.0008 128.67** 1559.10 .142* .06 2.01
(.001) (59.39) (6920.63) (.084>
.0006124.59** 108418.90** •j49* .10 2.00
(.001) (55.13) (43646.26) (.083)
lDAYb .0008122.86**520.10 .141* .06 2.00
(.001) (56.56) (1855.86) (.085)
.0009 112.08* 1958.37 .135.07 2.00
(.001) (61.40) (3604.52) (.086)
.0008123.73** 21.89.147* .06 2.01
(.001) (57.65) (3473.89) (.085)
TOTALc .0008152.23 88.86 .148* .06 2.01
(.001) (120.18) (329.60) (.083)
a) Intervention variables (I, I8, IFED) are end-of-day before the survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between surveyforecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginningof the
sample period.
* significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level.
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ESTIMATION TECHNIQUE: INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES








(Intervention expressed as percent of wealth.)
INTERV-
ENTION 2(x—I) 2(x—IBB) 2(x—IFED) R10
D.%J.
l.DAya .0007142.59** 5350.09 .1292.01
(.001)(59.64) (6810.90) (.517)
.0007141.66** 5124.03 .1302.00
(.001) (60.15) (7305.55) (.522)
.0007 126.34** 71641.36 .146 2.00
(.001) (55.98) (62224.98) (.465)
7DAYb .0007 112.21*6158.61* .0841.99
(.001) (59.26) (3661.81) (.808)
.001 26.92 16098.73** .0532.00
(.001) (80.25) (7950.05) (.995)
.0005 152.69** 6761.66 .114 2.00
(.001) (61.01) (6265.92) (.707)
TOTALC .0006 -169.28 -913.98 .1682.02
(.001) (370.13) (1131.86) (.423)
a) Intervention variables (I, IEB, IFED, REP!) are end-of-day before the
survey measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginning of the
sample period.






+ fliv + + Uk
WEEKLY UNCONSTRAINED ONE-WEEK-ABEAD RISK PREMIUMEQUATION
(OBS— 153, k—7)
(Intervention in millions of $.)
INTERV-
ENTION 2(x—I) fi2(x—18B) Ø2(x—IFED) P110
R2 D.W.
lDAYa .0007140.67** .165.04** .123.09 2.00
(.001)(55.70) (.776-05) (.083)
.0007135.65** .118-04 .125.07 2.01
(.001) (56.39) (.973-05) (.083)
.0006122.67** 373..04**.170** .10 2.01
(.001) (55.30) (.157-04) (.082)
lDAYb .0008116.44**.371O5* .123.09 2.00
(.001) (55.79) (.193-05) (.083)
.001 106.21* .76905** .107.09 2.00
(.001) (56.15) (.338-05) (.083)
.0007125.06** .307-05 .141* .07 2.01
(.001) (56.06) (.304-05) (.083)
TOTALC -.0009121.62** -.296-06 .138* .07 2.01
(.001) (56.08) (.261-06) (.083)
a) Intervention variables (I, IBB, IFED) are end-of-day before the survey
measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between surveyforecasts
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginningof th
sample period.
* significant at the 90% level; ** significant at the 95% level.
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(Intervention in millions of $.)
INTERV-
ENTIONo $2(x—I) 2(x—IBB) 2(x—IFED) RHO
D.W.





(.001) (56.24) (.163-04) (.459)
]DAYb .0008119.14**.33OO5* .12S 2.00




(.001) (56.61) (.318-05) (.585)
TOTALC -.006107.07*-.111-05 .207 2.03
(.005) (60.02) (.875-06) (.374)
a) Intervention variables (I, 188, IFED, REPI) are end-of-day before the
survey measures.
b) Intervention variables are accumulated measures between survey forecasts.
c) Intervention variables are accumulated measures from the beginning of the
sample period.
*significantat the 90%level; **significantat the 95%level.
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